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Abstract 
We examine the extent to which managerial overconfidence creates value to acquirers in successful 
M&As undertaken by Chinese listed firms in the period of 2006–2012. The empirical results show 
that Chinese acquirers gain value in both the short run and the long run after the M&A 
announcement. Our study provides new evidence that the market responds favorably to M&A 
deals undertaken by acquirers with more managerial overconfidence in both the short run and the 
long run. Our multivariate analyses, however, show that managerial overconfidence has a minimal 
role in explaining the stock price movement. In addition, we find that firm size is an important 
determinant for the relationship between overconfidence and market reaction to merger deals. 
Taken together, we conclude that managerial overconfidence has little effect in driving merger and 
acquisition deals in China. 
 





Mergers and acquisitions (M&As)have been experiencing an unprecedented growth in the last two 
decades, becoming an important socio–economic phenomenon and a dominant growth strategy for 
many corporations around the world(Houston & Ryngaert, 1994; Harford, 2005).A review of the 
M&A trend worldwide shows that the number of deals has increased by 59.9%, and their value 
has increased by 176.5% over the period of 1995 and 2010 (DePamphilis, 2012).The motives that 
drive M&As have been subject to intensive examination. Many studies go on to explore its impact 
on the wealth of parties involved.Many of these studies demonstrate that bidding firms’ 
shareholders, on average, earn negligible returns, while others make small losses and at best break 
even surrounding the announcement date (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004; Masulis, Wang, & 
Xie, 2007; Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003, 2006). Findings from long–run studies are also 
inconclusive but suggest negative stock performance in general(Dutta & Jog, 2009; Lyon, Barber, 
& Tsai, 1999).  
Several major theories have been put forward to explain this phenomenon, Including efficiency 
theory, monopoly theory,raider theory, valuation theory, and hubris theory. Efficiency theory 
argues that M&As are expected to produce synergies with a lower cost of capital, better 
management, and operating synergies. Valuation theory, i.e. the private information hypothesis, 
proposes that acquirers are better informed than the target, and instead of sharing information with 
the target, they choose to buy the target to benefit their own shareholders. The majority of previous 
studies emphasize the foundation of rational investors. With the development of behaviour finance, 
researchers add psychology,with particular reference to managerial characteristics,tothe corporate 
behaviour framework.In particular, the hubris hypothesis theory proposes that Managers tend to 
be overoptimistic about their ability and overvalue M&A gains and synergies (Roll, 1986). This 
leads to aggressive acquisition and overpayment, damaging shareholders’ value. 
Many studies have identified managerial overconfidence in different markets. Hayward 
&Hambrick (1997) find overconfidence amongst U.S. bidders.They find that the premiums paid 
in acquisitions are highly associated with bidders’ CEO overconfidence. Malmendier & Tate (2008) 
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find supportive evidencethat the market reaction at the M&A announcement for overconfident 
CEOs (-90 basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (-12 basis 
points). Further Raj & Forsyth (2003) find that overconfident CEOs tend to make value–losing 
bids among the UK’s bidders. Yates et al. (1997) conduct a cross–country study on Taiwan, Japan 
and Australia,and compare the role of over–confidence withthat of the U.S.  They find that 
overconfidence among Asian managers is typically higher than among their western counterparts. 
Japanese managers, however, demonstrate less overconfidence compared to their peers in other 
countries. On the contrary, Lin et al. (2008)find managerial overconfidence among  Japanese 
acquirers.   
Evidence on China’ mergers and acquisitions is limited.Zhang (2003) studies Chinese M&A 
activities from 1993 to 2002 and finds that acquiring firms lose value and that the net influence on 
the acquirer and target together is not significant. Shi and Zhu (2010) find that managerial 
overconfidence helps drive M&A activities from 2006 to 2008.They find that there is a significant 
positive correlation between managerial overconfidence and MA activity. Jiang et al. (2011) 
identifyan insignificant relationship between overconfidence andthe undertaking of M&A 
activities for the period of 2002 – 2005. However, none of these studies, to the best of our 
knowledge, has examined the extent to which market performance (stock price movement) is 
influenced by managerial overconfidencein the course of M&A activities in China’s market.  
In this study, we examine the bidding firm's short– and long–run performancefollowing the 
announcement, and put emphasis onthe role of managerial overconfidencein how the market 
responds and performsin the case of successful M&A deals for the period 2006–2012.To this end, 
we compare and contrast its impact onthe short–run and long–run performance of acquirers with 
two levels of managerial overconfidence, and in the meantime control fora range of time–
dependent variables which incorporate a range of categories of acquirers and targets onshort–run 
and long–run market performance.Our study shows that acquirers gain value in both short– and 
long–runs after M&A deals. Our further results show that acquirers with a lower overconfidence 
level underperform compared to the entire sample of the firmsin the shortrun, while acquirers with 
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a high overconfidence level outperform in the short-run. However, in the long-run, acquirers with 
a lower overconfidence level underperform compared to those with a higher overconfidence level. 
Our multivariate analyses show that managerial overconfidence has little influence on the 
acquirer’s short–and long–run performance.Our further analysis on the basis of sub–groups by 
firm size provides supportive evidence that managerial overconfidence has no significant effect on 
the acquirer’s short–run performance, although managerial overconfidence has a positive impact 
on the acquirer’s long–run performance. We conclude that managerial overconfidence has an 
insignificant role in influencing market performance in the case of China’s M&A deals. 
Our study contributes to the literature in two fields. It examines the hubris hypothesis in the context 
of China’s M&As, and provides evidence to suggest that the hubris hypothesis has limited 
application to China’s market, which has animperfect legal system and ineffective supervision 
mechanism (Jiang et al., 2011), as well as a large proportion of state ownership (Zhou et al., 2012). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the role of managerial overconfidence in 
value creation to acquirers in China. Second, our study provides fresh evidence that managerial 
overconfidence leads to an increase in acquirers’ market performance in the short– and long–runs. 
Our study has practical implications for policy–makers and corporate and international investors 
who are contemplating Chinese M&As. In particular, our findings provide an indication to 
investors with respect to market efficiency, and potential implications for value creation from the 
managerial perspective, when they evaluate merger deals (Hartman, 1996), and provides a guided 
suggestion that CEOs should remain his overconfident decisionsas in Aktas et al. (2005). 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and discusses 
the main hypotheses. Section 3 discussesmethodological issues. Section 4 presentsand discusses 
the empirical results. Section 5 summarises our arguments. 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Overconfidence refersto the physiological phenomenon that people tend to overestimate the 
probabilityof upcoming events, and is one of the most robust discoveries in the psychology of 
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decision-making (Debondt and Thaler, 1994; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Many studies find 
overconfidence amongst entrepreneurs and managers.Cooper, Dunkelberg and Woo (1988) prove 
that overconfidence exists widely among entrepreneurs in America, and show that American 
entrepreneurs believe the probability of the success of their company is 22% higher compared to 
their peers. Landieret al. (2004) find a consonant conclusion for French entrepreneurs. Further, 
somenote that overconfident managers tend to make more investments (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005), while under-estimating the capital cost of their investments by 50 percent compared to their 
peers (Merrowet al., 1981). 
Roll (1986) proposes three testable hypotheses with the existence of hubris in M&A activities: a) 
the value of the bidding firm should fall after the M&A; b) the post–merger value of the target 
firm should increase; and c) the total value of the target and bidder firms as a whole should fall 
slightly.These influential hypotheses have engendered two main streams of empirical studies on 
the role of managerial overconfidence associated with M&A activities. 
One of the biggest challenges in studying hubris theory is measuring CEO’s overconfidence 
because there is no direct way to measure human physiological bias. Researchers have developed 
different variables as proxies for managerial overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate (2005) develop 
three dummy variables with CEO’s portfolio holdingsin proxy for overconfidence relating to the 
managerial decision to cash in stock options. 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) suggest that sources of CEO overconfidence may be embodied in 
recent organizational success, media praise for the CEO and the CEO’s self–importance. They 
develop three measures in proxy for CEO overconfidence: recent acquirer performance, media 
praise for the CEO, and relative compensation. Lin et al. (2005) design a proxy on the basis of the 
bias of the CEO’s forecast of its own firm’s profit.  
According to Hyward and Hambrick (1997), self–importance is an important source of hubris 
because managers’ fluctuating views of their abilities may originate from an inherent trait towards 
self–importance. Hayward and Hambrick (1997) construct a fourth proxy by combining the three 
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proxies. “Self–importance may be an aggregate construct, intersecting with or even composed of 
other personality traits such as self–esteem narcissism and the need for power” (Hyward and 
Hambrick, 1997). According to Frank (1985), the CEO’s salary relative to other officers in the 
same firm reveals CEO’s self–importance. According to Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989), CEOs 
have considerable influence upon the setting of their own salary and great control upon other 
managers' salaries. Therefore, the CEO’s salary relative to other managers in the same company 
reveals a CEO’s self–importance (Frank, 1985). Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) give an example 
of the use of this indicator. They find that a proxy for the CEO's dominance (the CEO's salary 
divided by the average salary for other managers) was significantly higher for bankrupt companies 
than for a matched group of survivor companies five years before they failed. 
Recent studies focus on the effect of managerial overconfidence on acquirers’ value. Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) show that overconfident CEOs have a 65% greater propensity to make an 
acquisition. They find that the market reacts more negatively to a M&As announcement for 
overconfident CEOs (–90 basis points) than for non–overconfident CEOs (–12 basis points). 
Hyward and Hambrick (1997) find that the premiums paid for acquisitions are highly associated 
with the four indicators of bidders’ CEO overconfidence. They also find that shareholders whose 
company has greater CEO overconfidence lose more value following an acquisition. Using two 
proxies for CEO overconfidence high acquisitiveness and inside dealings Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) find that overconfident acquirers suffer lower announcement returns and present worse 
long–run post merger performance than rational acquirers. Brown and Sarma (2007) use media 
coverage to construct the proxy for CEO overconfidence among Australian acquisitions, and show 
that CEO overconfidence has a significant effect on the acquisition decision. Raj and Forsyth (2003) 
use bid premiums and valuation ratios as the measures to identify overconfident acquirers among 
successful M&As in the UK during the 1990s, and show that overconfident acquirers lose value 
significantly during the announcement period. Lin et al. (2008) study Japanese M&As using past 
stock performance as the proxy for overconfidence. Their result show that high overconfident 
bidders experience negative abnormal returns, while the opposite holds for low overconfident 
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bidders during the event period.  
Researches on China’s market have recognized the role of managerial overconfidence. Wrightand 
Phillips (1980) show that Asians are more likely to assess extreme and unrealistic numerical 
probabilities compared to British people, suggesting a higher level of overconfidence in Asian 
countries. Yates et al. (1989) find that cultural differences of overconfidence can be seen in the 
process of decision-making and that Chinese culture reveals a higher overconfidence level among 
Chinese than Japanese and Americans. Wanget et al. (2008) examine the investment decision of 
Chinese listed firms and find that overconfident managers tend to over–invest. 
Fu and Fang (2008) apply a prosperity index to measure overconfidence and find that managerial 
overconfidence drives acquisitions. Jiang et al. (2009) use two proxies for overconfidence –
conflict times of earning forecast and relative salary of top 3 managers – to study Chinese listed 
companies from 2003 to 2006, and find an insignificant negative relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and the acquirer’s tendency to undertake M&A activity.Their result is at odds with 
the conclusions of many previous studies on other markets. 
Jiang et al. (2011) argue that Chinese managers are more overconfident than managers in other 
countries because of the traditional culture, imperfect legal system and ineffective supervision 
mechanism in China. The deeply rooted Confucianism in Chinese traditional culture, which 
honours the culture of hierarchy to an extreme degree, gives the CEO dominating power over the 
company. The fact that quite a lot of CEOs are also presidents of their companies strengthens this 
domination (Jiang et al., 2011). Further, China lacks a necessary supervision mechanism which 
can effectively offset CEO’s dominating power, causing managerial overconfidence.  
To date, there are not any managerial stock options in China’s stock market. We use manager’s 
relative salary ratio as the proxy for managerial overconfidence – manager’s relative salary ratio 
equals the highest salary of all top managers of bidding firms divided by the average salary of all 
top managers of the same firm.A higher relative salary ratio in the year of a deal announcement 
reflects a higher managerial overconfidence level (REFs). In line with Roll (1986) that the value 
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of an overconfident bidder falls after the merger, we state our hypothesis as follows: 
𝐻1: Managerial overconfidence has a negative effect on a Chinese acquirer’s short–run and long–
run market performance.  
In what follows, we apply quantitative methodologies adopted by previous studies for the Chinese 
M&A market and test this hypothesis. 
 
3. Methodological issues 
3.1.Data and sample selection 
We examine successful M&A transactions in China’s stock market in the period 2006–2012.The 
acquiring firm must be a Chinese firm listed eitheron the Shanghai Stock Exchange or on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, while there is no restriction on the targets.The China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) provide data for managers’ salary from 1999.However, a large 
volume of data on salary is missing from 1999 to 2005. To ensure the data quality, we set the 
sample period from 2006 to 2012 when we carried out this study. The initial selection generates 
1,953 M&A deals. Data of M&A details, including acquirer name, target name, deal value, relative 
size and date, Price Index, accounting ratios, and firms’ Datastream code, are obtained from 
Thomson One Banker.We then match the code in Datastream and download stock price (𝑃𝑡), and 
calculate stock returns (𝑅𝑡 = ln⁡
𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
) from Datastream databse. Samples with missing data and 
negative M/B ratiosare deleted. 
To observe closely managerial overconfidence, we classify firms according to their levels of 
managerial overconfidence and firm size. First of all, we classify firms based on the median value 
of managerial overconfidence1. Firms above the median value are classified as firms with a higher 
level of overconfidence, while those below the median value as firms with a lower level of 
                                                          
1All results are consistent if using mean value instead. 
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overconfidence. Second, firms are grouped on the basis of firm size into small–sized acquirers and 
large–sized acquirers. Firms above the median value of total assets of the whole sample are 
classified as small–sized acquirers, while those below the median value as large–sized acquirers. 
     Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of deal numbers and value of transactions for the whole 
sample. The number ofsuccessful deals per year increases from 63 in 2005 to 492 in 2012 and the 
total value of transactions increases from $9,013 million in 1999 to $40,649 million in 2012. The 
number of effective/unconditional deals keeps growing at a high speed during the seven year 
period, especially in 2006 and 2007. The total value reaches its highest value in 2011 and falls 
slightly in 2012. Generally speaking, the M&A activities undertaken by Chinese listed firms have 
experienced an unprecedented growth in the past seven years. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of managers’ relative salary. The mean and standard deviation 
of managers’ relative salary remains relatively stable from 2006 to 2012. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
3.2.Measuring abnormal returns 
We adopt a modified market model to compute the short–run abnormal returns to acquirer (Brown 
and Warn, 1985). We use the value–weighted return of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange as the market return for the companies listed on the respective stock exchanges.  We 
calculate abnormal returns within 3 days around the deal announcement date using2 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑀,𝑡)𝑡+1𝑡−1                  (1)  
where𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the bidding firm i’s return on day t and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡  is the value–weighted return of the 
Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange on day t. The results are robust to equally weighted stock 
returns. 
To evaluate long–run post–merger market performance,we adopt buy–and–hold abnormal returns 
                                                          
2We also use a 5-day (‐2, +2) event window CAR on the M&A announcement date tests and find the results to remain 
consistent with our main findings. 
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(BHARs) (Lyon et al., 1999).We construct a reference portfolio instead of using a market portfolio 
as a benchmark to calculate abnormal returns.We construct the reference portfolio with size and 
M/B ratio on the basis of Fama and French’s (1993) three factor model. For a given montht, size 
is the average of monthly reported market value, and M/B ratio is an average ofmonthly reported 
market–to–book ratio.To construct the reference portfolio in montht,wefirst divide the bidding 
firms into five groups according to firm size. Each group is then divided into ten subgroups 
according toM/B ratio.We thencalculate the average monthly return of each subgroup in month 
t.Monthly returns are calculated with Total Return Index (RI) available from Datastream. The RI 
represents a theoretical value growth of a stock holding over a specified period, assuming that all 
dividends are re–invested to purchase additional stocks at the price on the ex–dividend day.   
The BHAR of a given acquirer is calculated over 24 months after the announcement dateas below3: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∏ (1 +𝑇𝑡=0 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − ∏ (1 +𝑇𝑡=0 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡))⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
where𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the real return of acquirer iin month t;𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is the expected return calculated with 
the reference portfolio; T is the length of studying  period, which is 24 months. 
3.3.Multivariate regressions on CARs and BHARs 
To investigate the influence of managerial overconfidence on acquirers’ short–run and long–run 
performance, we adopt multivariate ordinary least square (OLS) regressions. The dependent 
variable is the 3–day CAR for the acquirer’s short–term market performance or BHAR for the 
acquirer’s long–term market performance. The independent variables are managerial 
overconfidence proxy and other controlling variables that may influence the acquirers’ 
performance. The regression models are shown as below: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠⁡𝑜𝑟⁡𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝑐 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛼3𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦 +
𝛼5𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +
𝛼8𝑀
𝐵
+ 𝛼9𝐵𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝛼10𝑆𝑔𝑜𝑣 +
                                                          




∑𝛽𝑖𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + ∑𝛾𝑗𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜖6                                                               (3) 
where Relative salary measures managerial overconfidence, and is equal to maximum salary of all 
top managers divided by the average salary of all top managers from a bidding firm.We include a 
set of control variables. According to Loughran and Vijh (1997), the method of payment can be 
related to merger performance.They find that firms that complete mergers with stock earn 
significantly less than firms that complete tender offers with cash. One possible explanation could 
be that firms tend to pay in stock when their stocks are overvalued, whereas firms tend to pay in 
cash when their stocks are undervalued.To control the payment effect, we generate two dummy 
variables: 100 cash payment and 100 stock payment. Cash is equal to one if the deal is paid with 
100% cash, and zero otherwise. Stockequals one if the payment method is 100% stock, and zero 
otherwise.To capture the cross–industry effect, we include firm diversity, Diversify. Diversify is 
a dummy variable, which equals one if the acquirer’s first two–digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the target. We measure firm size, Log total asset, 
by the logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets one accounting year before the announcement date. 
Leverage is the ratio, which equals the long–term debt divided by total assets of the acquiring firm 
one accounting year before the announcement date. 
Moeller et al. (2004) find that small acquirers earn significantly higher announcement returns than 
average, suggesting the existence of a size factor in acquisition returns. Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins (1983) find that the relative size of the target to the acquirer has a significant influence on 
the returns of the acquiring firm surrounding a merger. To control this relative size effect, we add 
Log relative size, which is equal to the logarithm of the value of transactions divided by the 
acquiring firm’s total assets in the last fiscal year before the announcement.In the model, Leverage 
is the ratio that equals long–term debt divided by the total assets of the acquiring firm one 
accounting year before the announcement date. We also add market–to–book ratio of the acquiring 
firm, M/B, as measured by the total market value of equity over total assets of the acquiring firm 
one year before the announcement date. 
State ownership of the acquirer or the target may influence the short–run and long–run 
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performance of the Chinese acquiring firms (Zhou et al., 2012).We introduced two dummy 
variables in the regressions. Bgov equals one if the government gets involved on the buyer side– 
the acquirer, investor is government or the acquirer, the investor is directly or ultimately owned 
by the government, in the M&A deal; otherwise zero. Sgov equals one if the government gets 
involved on the seller’s side –the seller is government or thetarget, seller is directly or ultimately 
owned by the government in the M&A deal. Otherwise, Sgov equals to zero. We also include year 
dummies and industry dummies to control for year effects and industry effects, respectively. 
Table 3 reports basic statistics of the key variables in the estimations. The mean values of Cash 
and Stock suggest that 26% and 11% of all deals are paid with cash and stock respectively. In our 
sample, nearly half of all mergers are cross-industry deals. For all the deals, the size of the targets 
is smaller than that of the acquirer. As shown in Table 3, the average debt level of acquirers is 
quite low, suggesting that acquirers in China have sufficient debt capacity before merger deals. 
Roughly 12% of the acquirers and 26% of the targets have a relationship with the government. 
Insert Table 3 here. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Managerial overconfidence andthe acquirer’s short–run market performance 
Table 4 reports the CARs of acquirers in different groups over the 3–day window of the deal 
announcement. It appearsthat the announcement effectfor the whole sample is significantly 
positive4. This is inconsistent with Moeller et al. (2004) that bidding firms lose value on average 
at announcement. Our further results show that the average return of the firms with lower 
managerial overconfidence (0.67%, p<0.01) is lower than the average of the whole sample, while 
the opposite holds for firms with higher managerial overconfidence (0.78%, p<0.01).  
Insert Table 4 here. 
                                                          
4 All parametric t-tests are skewness corrected following Hall (1992). 
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In summary, our univariate test of CARs shows that the whole sample displays positive abnormal 
returns around the deal announcement. This suggests that the Chinese market responds favourably 
to the M&A announcement. Our result is at odds with those of earlier researches that acquirers 
lose value on average at announcement.  
Coming to the sub–group analysis by managerial overconfidence, we find that firms with lower 
overconfidence report a lower average 3–day CAR than the whole sample, while the opposite 
holds for firms with higher overconfidence. Firms with higher overconfidence present higher 
average CARs than those with lower overconfidence, suggesting that the Chinese market responds 
more positively to M&A deals undertaken by acquirers with high managerial overconfidence. 
Overall, our resultsshow that managerial overconfidence creates value to acquirers in the short run. 
 
4.2.Managerial overconfidence and the acquirer’s long–term market performance 
The results of long–run market performanceare reported in Table 5. It appears that acquirers’ 
average 24–month BHAR of the whole sample is significantly positive at the 1% level, suggesting 
that markets perceive that M&As create value to the acquirers in the long run. 
Further, our results on the basis of managerial overconfidence level show that firms with a lower 
overconfidence level have a significantly positive average BHAR (9.24%) at the 1% level, but 
their average BHAR is lower than that of the whole sample (16.87%). Firms with a 
higheroverconfidence level demonstrate a higher average BHAR compared to the whole 
sample.Our long–term performance analysis suggests that M&As enhance firm value in the long 
run, and managerial confidence facilitatesvalue creation to the acquirers. The evidence of 
univariate analysisdoes not support our hypothesis that the market devalues acquirers with 
overconfident managers.  
In summary, the evidence of our univariate analysisdoes not support the hypothesis that the market 
devalues acquirers with overconfident managers in both the short– and long–run.  
Insert Table 5 here. 
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4.3. Multivariate regression 
The results of multivariate regression on CARsare reported in Table 6.Most notably, managerial 
overconfidence generates a positive impact on market performance, which is consistent with the 
possibility that the market attributes better valuation to acquirers with higher overconfidence. 
However, this result is not statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient of stock payment is 
significantly positive at 1.05, indicating that the Chinese market responds favourably to M&A 
deals with 100% stock payment in the short run. More precisely, stock payment leads to 1.05% 
increase in stock return. This is consistent with our hypothesis that the market prefers M&A deals 
with 100% stock payment.Diversify has little impact on the 3–day CARs. This may be an 
indication that cross–industry acquisitions do not bring in complementary value to the resultant 
firm as proposed by the coinsurance hypothesis (Seth, 1990). The size of the targets, Log relative 
size, has a highly significant positive influence on the 3–day CARs at the 1% level, suggesting that 
a 1% increase in firm size generates 0.47% higher stock returns. This indicates that acquiring larger 
targets is more beneficial to acquirers in China’s market. We suggest two reasons. The cost of 
purchase is not a big concern for acquirers; and large targets would bring in value which may 
complement their businesses through diversification. Sell side government involvement shows a 
highly significant, positive effect on CARs. This indicates that the Chinese market believes that 
buying a target which is owned by the government (or has a heavy government involvement) may 
enhancevalue for acquirers.This could be for political reasons (Biais and Perotti, 2002), or due to 
the Chinese legal system (Bortolottiet al., 2002).When it is the largest stakeholder of a partially 
privatised firm, the government sends the market an implicit signal that it will not expropriate 
other shareholders’ wealth (Zhou et al., 2012).Financial leverage generates a positive effect on 
CARs at the 10% level. This may suggest that acquirers with a higher debt level would promise 
better performance due to the binding power inherent in disciplinary contracts, at least in the short 
run.  




The results of multivariate regression on the 24–month BHARs are reported in Column B in Table 
6. Most notably, managerial overconfidence has little influence on the acquirer’s long–run market 
performance. Our results do not support Yates et al. (1997, 1998), who suggest that overconfidence 
in China is robust and the Chinese tend to be more overconfident than people in other countries 
such as America. Moreover, the coefficients on both cash andstock payments are statistically 
insignificant, indicating thatthe payment method does not affect market performance in the long 
run. Acquiring a target from a different industry does not show any significant influence on the 
long–run performance. Firm size has a significant positive influence on BHARs at the 1% level, 
which is consistent with our result for short–run market performance. These results suggest that 
the Chinese market favours M&As with large targets in both the shortrun and the longrun.This is 
consistent with previous literature (Moeller et al., 2004).Financial leverage, however, shows a 
significant negative effect on BHARs at the 5% level, which is contrary to our results for short–
run market performance. This suggests that Chinese acquirers with higher debt levels gain less 
value in the long run, despite making gains in the short run. This short-run effect of financial 
leverage is consistent with the conclusion of Ghosh and Jain (2000) that theleverage ratio of US 
acquirers has a positive effect on the announcement period market-adjusted returns. 
     Overall, our multivariate regressions on CARs and BHARs using the whole sample show that 
managerial overconfidence has little influence on both the short–run or the long–run performance 
of the acquirers. Basing on the regression result, the hubris hypothesis that MAs are driven by 
managerial overconfidence cannot be accepted in the Chinese market. 
To have a closer look at the impacts of managerial overconfidence on market performance, we 
divide the sample into small–sized acquirer group and large–sized acquirer group according to the 
acquirer’s firm size. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 7.Our CARs results in 
Column A show that managerial confidence has no impact on the 3–day CARs in the case of 
small–sized acquirers. Further, stock payment has a positive effect on the 3–day CARs at the 10% 
level. This is consistent with the results in Table 6. Firm sizehas a positive effect on CARs atthe 
1%level. M/B has a negative influence on the acquirer’s CARat the 10% level.With regards to 
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large–sized acquirers, managerial overconfidence has an insignificant, negative effect on short–
run performance.However, stock performance is significantly influenced by stock payments, 
dividends, and firm size. Our BHAR results show that the long–run performance of large–sized 
acquirersis significantly affected by managerial overconfidence, while the opposite holds for 
small–sized acquirers. 
Insert Table 7 here. 
In summary, the results of multivariate analyses with regards to different acquirers’ size further 
support ourprior observations that managerial overconfidence has an insignificant role in acquirers’ 
market performance in the short run as well as in the long run.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines acquirers’ market performance following the M&A announcement, and 
especially how  managerial overconfidence on the part of acquirers influences their post-
announcement market performance. We present new evidence that acquirers in China gain value 
through domestic acquisitions both in the short-run and the long-run. Our sub-sample analyses 
further show that the market has more confidence in acquirers with higher overconfidence than 
those with lower confidence in both the short run and the longrun.Ourmultivariate analyses show 
that managerial overconfidence has an insignificant influence on acquirers’ market performance 
in both the short and long-run after we control for a spectrum of the control variables. Our further 
analyses on the basis of the sub–samples by firm size substantiate our observations that managerial 
overconfidence plays a minimal role inacquirers’ market performance both in the shortrun and in 
the longrun.Ourresults have led us to conclude that managerial overconfidence plays only a minor 
role in driving China’s acquisitions.  
Our results appear to be inconsistent with many previous researches on developed markets, but 
our work has revealed idiosyncratic features and has some practical implications for investors and 
practitioners. The evidence that acquirers gain value after M&A deals in both the short and  long-
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run, and especially in those acquirers with higher managerial overconfidence, would provide 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of Deals 
 
Table 1 shows the time‐series distribution of deal numbers and transaction value of the initial sample. The initial 
sample is divided into seven subsamples according to deal announced date. The domestic target subsample reports 
those deals with a Chinese firm as target (Domestic target) and the foreign subsample relates to those with targets 
located outside of China (Foreign target). The figures shown represent the number of deals and value of transactions 




 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 SUM 
Number of deals 63 154 257 263 272 449 495 1953 
Domestic target 55 140 238 248 247 434 464 1826 
Foreign target 8 14 19 15 25 15 31 127 
Value of transactions 
($million) 9013 15461 26212 19467 23180 59679 40649 193661 
Domestic target 
($million) 3852 11401 14329 16446 19539 56842 37885 160294 
Foreign target 
($million) 5161 4060 11883 3020 3641 2837 2764 33366 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of managers’ relative salary 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of managers’ relative salary ratio in the year of deal announcement for all 
samples. The managers’ relative salary ratio of a sample company is equal to the maximum salary of all top managers 
divided by the average salary of all top managers. The time–series subgroups are classified according to announcement 




 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.3 
Median 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.9 
Maximum 11.6 9.0 11.9 12.7 7.7 10.6 11.6 
Minimum 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 
S.D. 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.5 
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Table 3. Basic statistics of the key variables in the estimation 
Table 3 reports the basic statistics of the key variables. Cash and Stock are dummy variables which equals to one if 
the M&A deal is paid with 100% cash and 100% stock respectively. Diversity is a dummy variable which equals to 
one if the acquirer’s first two–digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the target. 
Logrelativesize equals to the logarithm of the value of transaction divided by acquiring firm’s total assets the last 
fiscal year before the announcement, in our model. Logtotalasset is the logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets one 
fiscal year before the announcement date. Leverage is the ratio that equals to the long–term debt divided by total asset. 
M/B is the market–to–book ratio of the acquiring firm one month before the announcement date. Bgov and Sgov are 
dummy variables which equals to one if there is buy–side owned government involvement and sell–side government 
owned involvement respectively, in the M&A deal. Year and Industry are dummy variables representing for the 
announcement year and acquire industry, respectively. The initial sample includes all successful M&A deals 




 Cash Stock Diversity Logrelativesize Logtotalasset Leverage M/B Bgov Sgov 
Mean 0.26  0.11  0.47  -5.29  6.41  6.07  5.17  0.12  0.26  
Median 0  0  0  -5.32  6.31  0.87  3.14  0  0  
Maximum 1  1  1  -0.92  10.13  60.84  1358.86  1  1  
Minimum 0  0  0  -9.83  3.29  0.00  -74.14  0  0  
S.D. 0.44  0.32  0.50  0.95  0.73  9.79  35.98  0.33  0.44  
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Table 4. 3–day CARs surrounding the M&A announcement 
Table 4 shows 3–day CARs for acquirers with different managerial overconfidence level at the announcement day. 
The sample includes all successful M&A deals undertaken by Chinese listed firms form 2006–2012. The sample is 
divided into two subgroups according to acquiring firms’ managerial overconfidence level. Managerial 
overconfidence is measured with acquiring firms’ relative salary ratio, which equals to the maximum salary of all top 
managers divided by the average salary of all top managers in the year of announcement. Higher value of this proxy 
represents higher managerial overconfidence level. Group 1 and Group 2 represent the subgroups with low managerial 
overconfidence level and high managerial overconfidence level respectively. ***, **,* indicate the one–tail t-test 





Relative salary ratio is used as the proxy for 
overconfidence All acquirers 
Firm with lower 
overconfidence 
Firm with higher 
overconfidence 
 
Mean  0.73%*** 0.67%*** 0.78%** 
t–value  (9.59) (6.10) (7.46) 
Number  1688 844 844 
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Table 5.  24–month BHARs after the M&A announcement 
Table 5 shows 24–month post–announcement BHARs for acquirers with different managerial overconfidence level. 
The sample includes all successful M&A deals undertaken by Chinese listed firms form 2006–2012. The sample is 
divided into two subgroups according to acquiring firms’ managerial overconfidence level. Managerial 
overconfidence is measured acquiring firms’ relative salary ratio, which equals to the maximum salary of all top 
managers divided by the average salary of all top managers in the year of announcement. Higher value of this proxy 
represents higher managerial overconfidence level. Group 1 and Group 2 represent the subgroups with low managerial 
overconfidence level and high managerial overconfidence level respectively. ***, **,* indicate the one–tail t-test 




Relative salary ratio is used as the proxy for 
overconfidence All acquirers 
Firm with lower 
overconfidence 
Firm with higher 
overconfidence 
 
Mean  13.06%*** 9.24%*** 16.87%*** 
t–value  (6.48) (3.46) (5.60) 
Number  1715 857 858 
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Table 6. Multivariate regression on short– and long-run market performance 
Table 6 reports the results of OLS regression on 3–day CARs and 24-month BHARs as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠/𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝑐 + α1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦⁡ + α2Cash + α3Stock + α4Diversify + α5Logrelativesize +
α6Logtotalasset + α7Leverage + α8M/B + α9Bgov + α10Sgov + ∑βiYear + ∑γjIndustry , where Relativesalary 
is equal to maximum salary of all top managers divided by the average salary of all top managers from a bidding firm. 
Cash and Stock are dummy variables which equals to one if the M&A deal is paid with 100% cash and 100% stock 
respectively. Diversity is a dummy variable which equals to one if the acquirer’s first two–digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the target. Logrelativesize equals to the logarithm of the value of 
transaction divided by acquiring firm’s total assets the last fiscal year before the announcement, in our model. 
Logtotalasset is the logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets one fiscal year before the announcement date. Leverage is 
the ratio that equals to the long–term debt divided by total asset. M/B is the market–to–book ratio of the acquiring 
firm one month before the announcement date. Bgov and Sgov are dummy variables which equals to one if there is 
buy–side owned government involvement and sell–side government owned involvement respectively, in the M&A 
deal. Year and Industry are dummy variables representing for announcement year and acquire industry, respectively. 
The initial sample includes all successful M&A deals undertaken by Chinese listed firms form 2006–2012. Deals with 
missing data and negative M/B ratios are deleted. ***, **,* indicate significance of coefficients different from 0 at 





Column A: The dependent variable is 3–day CARs  Column B: The dependent variable is 24-month BHARs. 
Intercept 5.22* (1.67) 
 Intercept 130.8** (2.19) 
Relativesalary 0.02 (0.37) 
 Relativesalary 2.54 (1.44) 
Cash –0.17 (–0.87) 
 Cash –5.61 (–1.45) 
Stock 1.05*** (3.25) 
 Stock 1.80 (0.23) 
Diversify –0.23 (–1.36) 
 Diversify 3.79 (0.90) 
Logrelativesize 0.47*** (4.09) 
 Logrelativesize 8.27*** (2.82) 
Logtotalasset 0.10 (0.68) 
 Logtotalasset –3.62 (0.43) 
Leverage 0.02* (1.69) 
 Leverage –0.48** (–1.98) 
M/B –0.002 (–0.78) 
 M/B –0.13 (–0.65) 
Bgov 0.05 (0.18) 
 Bgov –2.35 (–0.33) 
Sgov 0.31 (1.46) 
 Sgov –1.62 (–0.31) 
Year & Industry –  Year & Industry – 
Adjusted 𝑅2 7.60%  Adjusted 𝑅2 2.39% 
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Table 7 Multivariate regressions on CARs and BHARs of different size acquirers 
Table 7 reports the results of OLS regression on 3–day CARs or 24–month BHARs of different size acquirers as 
follows: 
CARs/BHARs = c + α1𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦⁡ + α2Cash + α3Stock + α4Diversify + α5Logrelativesize +
α6Logtotalasset + α7Leverage + α8M/B + α9Bgov + α10Sgov + ∑βiYear + ∑γjIndustry, where, Relativesalary 
is equal to maximum salary of all top managers divided by the average salary of all top managers from a bidding firm. 
Cash and Stock are dummy variables which equals to one if the M&A deal is paid with 100% cash and 100% stock 
respectively. Diversity is a dummy variable which equals to one if the acquirer’s first two–digit Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) code is different from that of the target. Logrelativesize equals to the logarithm of the value of 
transaction divided by acquiring firm’s total assets the last fiscal year before the announcement, in our model. 
Logtotalasset is the logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets one fiscal year before the announcement date. Leverage is 
the ratio that equals to the long–term debt divided by total asset. M/B is the market–to–book ratio of the acquiring 
firm one month before the announcement date. Bgov and Sgov are dummy variables which equals to one if there is 
buy–side owned government involvement and sell–side government owned involvement respectively, in the M&A 
deal. Year and Industry are dummy variables representing for announcement year and acquire industry, respectively. 
Half 1 and Half 2 refer to subsample with small firm size and large firm size, respectively. Deals with missing data 
and negative M/B ratios are. ***, **, and * indicate significance of coefficients different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, 10% 
level respectively.  
Panel A:  
Relativeslary is included 






















































































Year & Industry – – – – 
Adjusted 𝑅2 10.02% 7.42% 2.41% 3.84% 
 
 
 
